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DLD-164                NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1283 
___________ 
 
MARILYN KENT, 
    Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
FLORENCE VICKERS 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-00116) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 19, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: June 5, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Marilyn Kent appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania’s order dismissing her complaint.  Because this appeal does not 
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present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See
I. 
 3d 
Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In January, 2012, Kent filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the 
District Court.  Her complaint was entered on the District Court’s docket on January 17, 
2012, the same day that it granted Kent’s motion to proceed IFP and dismissed her 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).   
 Kent’s complaint, which is one in a series of actions involving her horses, appears 
to assert that, in December 2009, she and Florence Vickers entered into a contract to 
house Kent’s horses in Vickers’s barn.  She contends that, throughout the next several 
months, her horses suffered due to the poor condition of the barn and that Vickers 
responded to her complaints by turning off the barn’s water supply.  Kent was thus 
required to carry water to her horses.  Kent asserts that Vickers threatened her, assaulted 
her, “bullied” her, harassed her, slandered her, and breached their contract.  She also refers 
to a claim for damages by Vickers, which she states is based on fraud and corruption.    
 The District Court’s order dismissing the complaint explained that Kent, as a 
private citizen, did not have the right to bring a criminal case against the defendant nor 
could she proceed on a civil cause of action based on federal criminal laws.  Additionally, 
the District Court stated that she had not met the requirements for bringing state law 
claims under the District Court’s diversity jurisdiction because she and the defendant are 
Pennsylvania residents.  
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 Kent now appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is plenary.  
Allah v. Seiverling
 If a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal, a district court generally must first permit 
the plaintiff to file a curative amendment.  
, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete 
Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that, in civil rights cases, 
“leave to amend must be granted sua sponte before dismissing” the complaint).  “Dismissal 
without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, 
prejudice, or futility.”  Alston v. Parker
 Here, the District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint without providing 
Kent with an opportunity to amend her complaint because any such amendment would be 
futile.  
, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). 
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
District Court properly dismissed any criminal claims that Kent attempted to bring, as a 
private person does not have a “judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution . . . of 
another.”  See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).  Additionally, to the 
extent that Kent attempted to raise any state law claims, the District Court properly 
determined that such claims would be futile because Kent cannot meet the requirements 
for proceeding under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction.  Although allegations of 
jurisdiction generally may be amended, in this case it is clear from the complaint that 
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both parties are Pennsylvania citizens and that the jurisdictional defect cannot be cured.  
See
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,” 
and will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
See
 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.     
